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NO. 7 JANUARY 2021 Introduction 
Strategic Sovereignty in Energy Affairs 
Reflections on Germany and the EU’s Ability to Act 
Kirsten Westphal 
Germany’s energy sovereignty is undermined by US sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 
gas pipeline. As a result, questions surrounding states’ strategic capability in energy 
affairs have recently become a matter of discussion, particularly in Germany, where 
little attention was previously paid to the notion of energy sovereignty. In view of 
today’s fundamental upheavals in international politics, especially with regard to the 
geostrategic US-China rivalry, debates about a state’s ability to formulate its strategic 
interests, prioritise its actions and shape its options for energy policy are becoming 
increasingly important. China’s industrial and connectivity policies, the role of the 
US in energy markets and the energy transformation at large are rapidly changing 
the global energy landscape and tipping balances of power. The Covid-19 pandemic 
further accelerates and reinforces these trends. Therefore, it is necessary to integrate 
energy sovereignty into political debates on the future of sustainable and resilient 
energy supplies, particularly at the EU level. In order for this to occur, strengthening 
EU cohesion remains a prerequisite, if not a conditio sine qua non. 
 
Of the three vertices that constitute the 
strategic target triangle of energy policy, 
“environmental sustainability” and “com-
petitiveness” have dominated Germany’s 
energy policy since the turn of the mil-
lennium, while the third vertex, namely 
“security of supply”, has been deempha-
sised. In Germany, energy supply has been 
seen through the lens of the functioning 
market, and rarely against the backdrop 
of geopolitics. This is because Germany’s 
energy supply relies on functioning and 
competitive domestic and global markets. 
With the dissolution of the so-
called Deutschland AG, Germany first 
privatised its energy companies, then 
unbundled and resold them. By contrast, in 
other (even market-oriented) EU Member 
States, such as the Netherlands, the state 
remained actively involved in the affairs of 
energy companies. Germany’s market and 
efficiency-based orientation has meant that 
decisions regarding the country’s energy 
policies have been driven by technical and 
commercial considerations. The situation is 
quite different in France, Poland and the 
Baltic States, for example, where sovereign-
ty has long functioned as the guiding 
principle of energy affairs. 





Strategic sovereignty in the realm of energy 
is characterised by an environment in which 
sufficient, reliable and affordable energy 
supplies and services are provided in a man-
ner that does not conflict with, or further 
yet, endanger a country’s values, interests 
or foreign policy goals (Daniel Yergin). Sov-
ereignty in energy affairs is therefore not 
synonymous with supply security but in-
stead requires a technically robust energy 
system that is resilient in crises and forti-
fied against political influence, thereby 
forming the basis of the state’s strategic 
autonomy and capability to act in energy 
affairs. Nonetheless, while necessary, such 
sovereignty is in and of itself insufficient 
in guaranteeing a country’s sustainable 
energy security over time. 
Strategic room for manoeuvre is deter-
mined by the ways in which energy security 
is guaranteed on a continual basis. This 
requires flexibility, diversification, and the 
ability to select from as many options as 
possible. Existent and future energy sup-
plies should not prevent relevant actors 
from pursuing and implementing their own 
political, foreign, security and energy policy 
priorities. In doing so, states must have the 
institutional, political and material means 
to implement these priorities cooperatively 
or, if necessary, of their own accord 
(see SWP Research Paper 4/2019). 
To maintain and expand the strategic 
ability to act, dependence must be reduced 
in instances where it leads to vulnerability. 
Autonomy, however, should in no way be 
confused with autarchy. On the contrary, 
strategic partnerships and mutual relations 
may well help to widen the range and scope 
of available actions.  
Strategic sovereignty has an internal 
dimension, too, as goals, interests and guid-
ing principles should be clearly defined. A 
basic consensus within a political commu-
nity is required. 
Nord Stream 2 and the 
EU Energy Union 
Nord Stream 2 is a contentious issue, be-
tween the German government on the 
one side, and Brussels, certain EU Member 
States, and the US on the other. In Ger-
many, the issue of energy sovereignty is 
almost exclusively discussed through the 
prism of Nord Stream 2, while in the EU, 
Nord Stream 2 presents a major obstacle 
to joint action. 
Berlin’s legal position, which is grounded 
in the application of German and interna-
tional law (see SWP Research Paper 3/2017), 
was undercut in April 2019 when the EU 
amended its 2009 Gas Directive and there-
with extended the rules of the EU internal 
market to apply to pipelines connecting EU 
territory with third countries. Consequent-
ly, more competences in the EU’s foreign 
energy policy shifted from Member States to 
Brussels. Such represents a broader trend: 
increasing EU regulation transforms highly 
political issues into administrative actions. 
While this means that the issues at hand 
are less likely to be politicised, it also limits 
the scope of political action available to 
Member States. 
Moreover, Berlin’s sovereignty has been 
curtailed by the US’s determination to pre-
vent Nord Stream 2’s realization. Here, the 
US issued a series of sanctions and public 
guidance (CAATSA, PEESA and PEESCA) that 
halted the pipeline’s construction at the end 
of 2019. They also strove to halt its comple-
tion by targeting crucial services and tech-
nical operations. This has put the German 
government and its federal states in a dif-
ficult position, as they either buckle under 
US sanctions or actively flank Russian pipe--
laying activities. 
The developments surrounding Nord 
Stream 2 show how little Berlin has focused 
on its own interests in its external commu-
nications. The doubling of the capacity of 
pipelines from Russia directly to Germany 
to 110 billion cubic metres signifies a major 
strategic gain for Germany as it minimises 
transit risks, strengthens the German gas 
market and bolsters Germany’s position as 
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a regional gas hub and industrial nexus. 
Certainly, this strategic added value should 
have been weighed against political rifts 
within the EU and considered the impacts 
on Ukraine. Indeed, the European Commis-
sion and several Member States saw this 
development as undermining the goals of 
the EU Energy Union and inhibitive of in-
dividual states’ efforts to achieve greater 
energy sovereignty. Germany has so far not 
openly addressed this conflict of interest 
given its strict focus on the market and 
legal principles. 
Article 122 of the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union (TFEU) stipu-
lates that the concept of solidarity shall be 
guided by measures appropriate to the eco-
nomic situation. Thus, economic interests 
would have forced opponents of the pipe-
line to balance diverging interests – or 
at least to confront Germany’s position. 
Finally, other EU states have called for soli-
darity based on their own political and eco-
nomic interests. Security of supply, solidar-
ity and trust form the first dimension of the 
EU Energy Union. At the same time, each 
Member State has the “right to determine 
the conditions for exploiting its energy re-
sources, its choice between different energy 
sources and the general structure of its 
energy supply” (Article 194(2) TFEU). 
Trust and solidarity are ultimately based 
on diffuse promises and assumptions about 
others’ future behaviours based on com-
mon principles and leitmotifs. However, if 
guiding principles are not shared from the 
onset or if economic interests are opposed, 
Member States must seek to balance their 
interests. In the case of Nord Stream 2, it 
has not been possible to reach a consensus 
within the EU. Due to a complaint by 
Poland, the European Court legally assessed 
the exemption of the OPAL pipeline that 
connects Nord Stream 1 with the Czech 
Republic, and, in the course of the adjudi-
cation, readjusted the application of the 
solidarity principle. Since then, the prin-
ciple has been established not only as a 
political leitmotif but also as a criterion 
for administrative and regulatory decisions. 
In the EU, the triad of energy security, soli-
darity and sovereignty thus faces major dis-
sonance. 
While the strategic target triangle of 
energy policy, consisting of “environmental 
sustainability”, “competitiveness” and 
“security of supply”, offers a unique frame 
of reference and provides for synergy be-
tween objectives, it also embodies inherent 
areas of conflict that must be balanced. The 
paradigm of the market has lost vigour to 
the primacy of politics, and Member States 
differ in their interpretations of energy sov-
ereignty, supply security, and climate pro-
tection. These political tensions appear to 
be decoupled from the comfortable supply 
within oil and gas markets, from which the 
EU has benefitted for over a decade. 
Security of Supply and 
Sovereignty 
Supply security constitutes the basis for 
strategic action, and most of Germany’s 
energy demand is still met by oil and gas 
(60 percent). Although Germany relies 
heavily on imports for its oil (98 percent) 
and natural gas (94 percent) supplies, in-
creasing competition within the global oil 
and gas markets over the past decade has 
created many options and flexible sources 
of supply. This has led to a “buyer’s mar-
ket” that has shifted the balances of power 
in favour of consumer countries. As a result, 
buyers are able to set the rules of the game, 
e.g. by setting pricing linkages and schemes. 
Yet, the EU’s internal oil and gas produc-
tion is steadily declining. Germany sources 
more than 50 percent of its gas imports 
from Russia, but is fully integrated into an 
EU gas market that has become increasingly 
diversified over the past few years. Imports 
via pipelines continue to be dominated by 
Russia, Norway and Algeria, and the share 
of liquefied natural gas (LNG) varies signi-
ficantly between 22 to 28 percent in 2020. 
In the EU gas market, the principle of 
solidarity has been translated into EU 
secondary legislation through prevention 
and crisis mechanisms. These were tested 
during Europe’s 2012 cold spell (see SWP 
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Comment 17/2012). Moreover, the 2014 
and 2017 stress tests showed relatively high 
degrees of resilience if EU Member States 
cooperated. From the German perspective, 
market and crisis mechanisms can there-
fore be relied upon. 
Eastern European Member States, how-
ever, have come to focus increasingly on 
energy sovereignty. This has resulted in the 
prioritisation of diversification away from 
Russia, and, first and foremost, integration 
into the global, not just EU, energy market. 
The German government has not perceived 
Russian imports as problematic in terms of 
contributing to economic vulnerability, but 
has instead regarded them as a component 
of mutual interdependence and the basis 
on which to create and foster common in-
terests. Among other Member States, on the 
other hand, Russian energy imports have 
been increasingly “securitized”, as econom-
ic issues of supply security are linked to 
broader security issues. The “compartmen-
talisation” approach propagated by Ger-
many and Austria, i.e. the limitation of the 
topic to the purely economic realm, espe-
cially in relation to Russia, has therefore 
found insufficient support within the EU. 
The differing approaches within the EU 
pose Germany with a dilemma: its ideas are 
not shared among EU Member States, yet it 
is foreseeable that Berlin will need EU co-
hesion in order to remain capable of acting 
and achieving energy security. 
There is a growing trend within the EU, 
but more so globally, characterised by the 
interlinking of energy, foreign policy and 
security affairs. Indeed, geopolitics and geo-
economics are increasingly intertwined, 
power rivalries are being fought with eco-
nomic means and economic pressure is 
being applied to achieve political goals. 
This creates a new environment and poses 
challenges for Berlin’s, and Brussels’s, 
ability to act. 
The US: No Longer a 
‘Natural’ Partner 
The US had been a partner of the Euro-
peans for decades; these two major con-
sumer centres had formed the nucleus of 
an “energy security community” under 
the umbrella of the International Energy 
Agency (IEA). In terms of security policy, 
Europe profited from the US, which guar-
anteed it open and accessible sea lanes 
and trade routes, including those from the 
Middle East and the Caspian region. 
The liberal principle of free trade of (en-
ergy) goods has lost its appeal today because 
the US has come to instrumentalise both its 
nodal role in global financial flows and the 
role of the dollar as the dominant currency 
in order to achieve foreign and economic 
policy goals. This is exemplified by Washing-
ton’s unilateral sanctions against Russia, 
Iran and Venezuela. The secondary effects 
of the US’s unilateral sanctions negatively 
affect European oil and gas companies, 
whose scope of action is being restricted in 
favour of state-owned corporations from 
Asia and the Middle East; a trend that the 
Covid-19 pandemic might intensify as state-
owned corporations find themselves able 
to draw on state funds. 
The shock for Europeans resultant of US 
policy is so profound because it highlights 
the new situation in no uncertain terms: 
the “energy-economic West” no longer exists. 
US policies expose Europe’s own inability 
to act. More than just lacking consensus, 
Berlin and Brussels lack effective levers and 
instruments that could cushion or avert 
the effects of US sanctions (see SWP-Studie 
28/2019 and SWP Comment 6/2019). 
The newly emerged reality of US energy 
self-sufficiency and abundance has deprived 
the alliance of its essential foundations. 
While unlikely, if the Biden administration 
continues to exploit its foreign (economic) 
policy options, as under Trump, the divide 
between the EU and the US will persist. 
Compared to the EU, the US will remain 
self-sufficient and may further supplement 
its energy abundance by rapidly expanding 
renewables and by developing new technol-
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ogies. The US is rich in solar and wind 
potential, and has the space to efficiently 
exploit these renewable energy resources. 
The EU, on the other hand, will continue 
to face traditional challenges to its energy 
security in the mid-term and will be re-
quired to find partners in order to success-
fully pursue its sustainable energy transfor-
mation. Moreover, expensive oil production 
projects in the North Sea and in Norway 
have become less commercially viable given 
relatively low oil prices resultant of the 
Covid-19 pandemic. Indeed, the pandemic 
could have a catalytic effect, as the above-
mentioned challenges highlight the EU’s 
need for an orderly exit from oil and the 
necessity to manage this process coopera-
tively with its suppliers, who are deeply 
affected by plunges in demand and price 
that in turn contribute to instability among 
the EU’s neighbouring regions. 
Transformation of the Energy 
System, and the Strategic 
Capability to Act 
The energy transformation involves a two-
fold systemic change: the phasing out of the 
conventional energy system and the crea-
tion of a system based on sustainable energy. 
The challenges that this transformative pro-
cess poses for governance are considerable. 
In parallel, supply security must be guar-
anteed, all while striking the right balance 
between efficiency and energy security. 
From a climate and environmental per-
spective, transformation of the energy 
system is urgent. Once implemented, it will 
offer more political room for manoeuvre 
because renewable resources, which are 
available everywhere, can provide energy 
locally and in a decentralised manner. 
However, this process of change brings 
with it a long list of imponderables 
(see SWP Comment 42 2018). Fossil fuels 
will continue to be cheap for the foreseea-
ble future and affordable energy will aid 
the post-Covid-19 economic recovery in Ger-
many and the EU. Here, difficult balances 
will need to be struck: on the one hand, 
short-term, quick profits maintain the 
existing energy system; on the other hand, 
relatively higher up-front costs of structural 
change bring with them the prospect of 
long-term benefits such as environmental 
sustainability and increased energy resili-
ence. The systemic transformation requires 
incremental change and structural ruptures 
that are not necessarily congruent with the 
disruption caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. 
The phasing out of fossil fuel imports may 
result in more autonomy, but not necessarily 
in more opportunities to shape the future, 
as relevant channels of international recon-
ciliation of interests, cooperation and dia-
logue are lost and the risk of conflict rises. 
In the future, energy relations will be 
driven far more by political decisions than 
in the past, when the geological availability 
of oil and gas had a structural effect. One 
example of this can be seen in electricity 
grids; the decision to (synchronously) inter-
connect is based upon political choice. 
“Electricity grid communities” share both 
risks and benefits. 
The EU’s high degree of supply security 
in the field of electricity is due to EU mar-
ket integration, which is the only way that 
Germany has been able to stabilise its elec-
tricity grids and trade electricity across its 
borders. In the future, Germany will grow 
even more dependent on a tightly meshed 
European network. In view of further elec-
trification and sector coupling, the demand 
for electricity in Germany is expected to 
grow. At the same time, Germany’s six re-
maining nuclear power plants and its coal-
fired power plants, with combined capac-
ities of 8.5 GW and 12.5 GW respectively, 
will be taken off the grid by 2022. In order 
to realise an exit path, Germany will need 
to pursue stabilisation measures, in particu-
lar by bolstering cross-border interconnec-
tion points and cross-border trade. 
In the economic sectors in which direct 
electrification is not possible, climate-neu-
tral molecules (see SWP-Aktuell 37/2020) 
will play an important role in the future. 
Here, too, more diversification is conceiv-
able because climate-neutral hydrogen and 
its derivatives can be produced and trans-
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ported in various ways and in various forms 
across the world. This enables a higher 
degree of flexibility and widens the scope 
for action, but requires international co-
operation. 
Finally, the transformation of the energy 
system requires access to and availability 
of metals and rare minerals, as well as their 
further refinement and processing. These 
value and supply chains engender new vul-
nerabilities, as they are sometimes domi-
nated by only a few companies, including 
those operated by China. 
China: the Systemic Challenge 
The transformation of the energy system 
will see the rising importance of industrial 
and technological policies. This will create 
new challenges. In the modern sustainable 
energy system, economic value is no longer 
derived primarily from the energy resource 
itself, but instead at the stage of conversion 
into end-use energy and services (see SWP 
Comment 42/2018). 
Clean energy technologies and innova-
tions are becoming components of geo-
economic competition. For Germany and 
the EU, the question of energy technology 
sovereignty is acutely relevant to the con-
trol and availability of critical raw materials, 
but also to (future) key technologies and 
skills. It is yet unknown which technologies 
and skills will be so strategically important 
as to justify their localisation within the 
EU. No doubt, the inherent tension between 
technological sovereignty, climate change 
mitigation and energy efficiency will rear 
its head in time. Simultaneously, value-
creation in Europe will continue to be cen-
tral to socio-economic resilience and wel-
fare, but also key to fulfilling the promise 
of green growth and jobs. 
What is clear, however, is that over the 
past decade China has placed itself in a key 
position with regard to energy technologies 
such as photovoltaics, batteries, electro 
mobility and concentrated solar power (CSP) 
tower power plants. Chinese companies 
offer platforms and system solutions; and 
they bundle smart applications through 
their supremacy in the fields of (5G) mobile 
internet, transmission networks and trans-
former stations. China dominates the supply 
and value chains of solar panels, from min-
ing to refining the raw materials required 
for solar panel plants. China produces over 
70 percent of the globe’s solar modules. 
A Bertelsmann study on world-class patents 
shows China’s rapid expansion in innova-
tion-driven energy sectors. Germany has 
lost its top position in photovoltaics to China. 
With respect to batteries, China holds nearly 
11 percent of the world’s patents, behind 
Japan and Korea, while Germany only holds 
7.5 percent thereof. 
When it comes to the strategic roll-outs 
of infrastructure and technologies, Beijing 
throws the weight of its market into the 
balance. Abroad, China uses a variety of 
state instruments through tightly or directly 
controlled companies. It offers package-deals, 
including loans, planning, organisation and 
implementation as well as technical system 
solutions in a type of “one-stop shop”. 
Following the financial crisis of 2008/ 
2009, Beijing invested in (critical) infra-
structure and key technologies within the 
EU. A repeat should be avoided after the 
Covid-19 pandemic. 
Beijing’s “Made in China 2025” and 
“China Standards 2035” strategies are clearly 
formulated. With its thirst for innovation, 
China continues to focus on localising high-
tech sourcing and production, all while 
striving for global technological leadership. 
Meanwhile, Beijing can build on advanta-
geous path dependencies whereby two criti-
cal infrastructures, namely energy and tele-
communication/information technology, 
are becoming increasingly intertwined. 
Beijing’s “Belt and Road” initiative fur-
ther redefines global interdependence and 
establishes channels of influence; the vec-
tors and dynamics of the initiative’s net-
work always lead to China. This strategy 
provides Beijing with access to and control 
over central nodes of energy and communi-
cation networks. Beijing uses these new 
techno-political spheres of influence be-
yond its territory to project political power 
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and authority (see SWP Research Paper 
4/2020, contribution Schulze and Voelsen). 
This new antagonism of space versus net-
work increasingly determines regional and 
global dynamics – also in the EU’s neigh-
bourhood. 
Territoriality as a principle of order and 
power is on the retreat. Modernisation and 
restructuring of the energy system both 
lead to the decoupling and recoupling of 
energy networks, and hence energy systems 
create new infrastructural spaces. These 
new energy spaces do not necessarily co-
incide with jurisdictions any longer. Gov-
ernance then takes place along techno-
political spheres unbound from territory. 
Norms and standards are at the heart of this 
newly emerging paradigm shift. The EU has 
linked its most important instrument – 
regulation – to its own legal area and to 
the “community of law” within the frame-
work of the European Energy Community. 
Traditionally, the sovereignty of the nation-
state is bound to its territory, but if a states’ 
ability to act depends on the availability of 
and control over new technologies, long-
standing notions of political authority can 
be weakened. Spaces, roles and rule-making 
are changing and classical security policies 
and geographical spheres of influence are 
becoming insufficient in exerting control 
over highly fluid flows of processes, goods, 
knowledge, capital and information. In this 
way, the EU is being confronted with the 
permeability of its power. 
Ways forward: 
towards Energy Sovereignty 
The European Coal and Steel Community 
was the beating heart of European integra-
tion. It recognised the need to establish 
common control over strategically impor-
tant sectors; a comparable strategic decision 
is due again today. If strategic sovereignty is 
to be granted greater weight, Germany and 
the EU must contemplate how the carbon-
neutral industry will look in 2050 as the 
basis for EU’s social market economy. The 
EU also needs to take inventory of its tool-
box, which has so far been limited to ordo-
liberal instruments and energy diplomacy. 
It is assumed that the strategic geoeconomic 
competition between China and the US 
will continue, pushing the EU to (re)posi-
tion itself. 
Firstly, while banal, cohesion within the 
EU is a necessary precondition to being 
heard within the concert of powers. To this 
end, the establishment of European sover-
eignty should be a clear reference point for 
Germany and Member States’ energy poli-
cies, especially in the presence of existing 
dissonance. 
Secondly, to address the challenges posed 
by a competitive geoeconomic environment, 
the EU should position itself to create and 
sustain technological leadership. Sovereign-
ty should not be defined as self-sufficiency 
or autarchy, but rather rely firmly on inter-
national integration, diversification and 
cooperation. Raw materials, supply chains 
and production clusters must then be 
designed not only according to the criteria 
of efficiency but also with an eye to resili-
ence by tracing the lines of substitutability, 
diversification and sustainability. 
Thirdly, strategic energy technologies, 
competencies and industries need to be 
identified and sustained. With regards to 
their crucial function in the modern energy 
system, off-shore wind energy, hydrogen and 
its derivatives, and digital grid management 
among others should be identified as key 
areas. Rapid development and implementa-
tion of these technologies will be necessary 
to take advantage of the EU’s good starting 
position, and not to gamble it away – as it 
did in the field of photovoltaics – to China. 
This means nothing short of producing stra-
tegically important technologies largely 
within the EU itself. Europe’s core compe-
tencies must be preserved at critical junc-
tions: in the high integration of renewable 
energies via transmission system operators, 
in near-real-time load management within 
the transmission system, in intra-day trad-
ing and in virtual power plants. By doing 
so, even if it has overslept the great informa-
tion technology revolution, the EU would 
have a leg up with respect to these strategic 
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junctions. It may also be worthwhile to ex-
plore the possibility of an “Airbus”-like 
project for green hydrogen and off-shore 
windfarms. Fuel cell and battery produc-
tion, electricity storage, carbon capture, uti-
lisation and storage (CCUS), and next-genera-
tion perovskite solar cells can be added to 
the list of technologies that the EU should 
develop and nurture. This may require to 
make changes to the market, the regulatory 
framework and to provide state-sanctioned 
aid for the period of time spanning the 
energy transformation. Home-based indus-
trial-sized production sites and supply chains 
constitute not only the basis for a more 
resilient, but also for a circular system. Last 
but not least, an own production base is the 
precondition to preserving strategic know-
how, technology and innovation skills in 
the EU. Only if this succeeds, will the EU 
be on the winning side of the energy trans-
formation. 
Fourthly, international partnerships are 
key, in particular with countries that price 
CO2 and follow the same rules, norms and 
standards. Yet, Germany and the EU need to 
be prepared for “systemic rivalry”. Its small 
and medium-sized enterprises and start-ups 
that dominate the fields of emerging tech-
nology face a difficult international envi-
ronment. That which once spurred innova-
tion and competitiveness has now become a 
disadvantage in foreign markets. Protection-
ism, localisation and sanctions make it more 
difficult to penetrate markets. The realisa-
tion and financing of strategic projects (such 
as the natural gas pipeline deals of the 
1970s/1980s) must become possible again 
in order to support the competitiveness of 
technology that is “Made in Germany/the 
EU”. In view of the new international en-
vironment, it is indeed a problem that 
today’s state has no channels to directly 
influence the energy sector, and that Ger-
many cannot sufficiently leverage its mar-
ket power within its foreign policy. What 
then, can be learned from the model 
of Deutschland AG? The corporatist negotia-
tion model offered opportunities at that 
time, creating strategically important social 
acceptance, too. Germany and the EU must 
then adapt their foreign trade instruments 
to the competitive international environ-
ment. 
Fifthly, the energy transformation needs 
to be accompanied by a producer-consumer 
dialogue in order to make the EU and Ger-
many’s exit from and restructuring of the 
current energy system crisis-proof. This will 
necessitate an approach that commences 
the paths toward restructuring the status 
quo towards climate neutrality, as opposed 
to beginning at the 2050 target and then 
deriving energy policy from climate targets. 
The obvious discrepancy between commu-
nicated climate targets and the real paths 
of consumption complicate this dialogue. 
In the face of the severe consequences of 
the Covid-19 pandemic, it should be empha-
sised in the end that energy sovereignty is 
of course only one guiding principle that 
must be balanced against “competitiveness” 
and “environmental sustainability” within 
the strategic target triangle of energy policy. 
It should be highlighted that the EU’s Green 
Deal, which links energy and climate policy 
with technological and industrial policy, 
is a suitable guiding concept to promote the 
transformation of the energy sector. After 
all, “business as usual” will not serve to 
secure intergenerational justice, service 
debts or provide true energy sovereignty. 
Dr Kirsten Westphal is a Senior Associate in the Global Issues Research Division at SWP. 
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